From Newsday

9/11 report: A failure of imagination'

Among 41 proposals issued, commission -- blaming no administration -- calls for one person to be in charge of intelligence gathering

BY THOMAS FRANK | WASHINGTON BUREAU

July 23, 2004

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WASHINGTON - The Sept. 11 commission blamed the U.S. government for failing to envision domestic suicide hijackings or to understand the severity of terrorist threats, and issued a final report yesterday recommending an array of domestic and foreign policies to improve security.

"The most important failure was one of imagination," the report said, suggesting intelligence analysis that will better detect potential attacks, security that will better prevent them and foreign policy that will better discourage them.

Commissioners exhorted the White House and Congress to quickly enact their proposals or face political consequences.

"Put simply, the United States is faced with one of the greatest security challenges in our long history," chairman Thomas Kean said. "We have struck blows against the terrorists since 9/11. We have, we believe, prevented attacks on the homeland. We do believe we are safer today than we were on 9/11. But we are not safe."

In its final report, the commission also said New York City should get far more federal homeland security money and slammed Congress and the administration for giving billions of dollars to areas that face little terrorist threat.

"The overarching evidence that every intelligence agency tells us is that the two biggest targets remain New York and Washington," Kean said.

But the main proposal among 41 recommendations is to put a single person, reporting directly to the president, in charge of all intelligence gathering and analysis to close gaps that let vital clues fall through the cracks before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Armed with the broadest range of intelligence, a national intelligence director could detect plots before they unfold or envision scenarios that need to be addressed.

The 567-page report, building on preliminary statements issued since March 2003, provides new details, including a dramatic recounting of the passenger revolt on Flight 93 that apparently came within seconds of controlling the plane before hijackers crashed it in a field in Pennsylvania.

Although no individual or administration is singled out for blame, the report criticizes some post-Sept. 11 actions.

Nearly two years after U.S.-led forces toppled the Afghan government harboring al-Qaida, southern and western Afghanistan are prime areas to establish a terrorist base, say foreign officials and military leaders the commission interviewed.

Domestically, the report notes that 90 percent of the money spent on transportation security goes to protect passenger planes -- "to fight the last war" -- while vulnerabilities remain in maritime and surface transportation and air cargo. The Transportation Security Administration, created shortly after Sept. 11, has failed to write a security plan covering the entire transportation sector or individual components.

The recommendations range from rebuilding scholarship and exchange programs with Muslim countries to setting standards for drivers licenses to improving education in Pakistan, where illiterate youths are drawn to terrorist causes.

In what could be interpreted as criticism of how the Bush administration is waging the war on terrorism, the report calls for a "balanced" strategy that includes not just military action but diplomacy and goodwilll.

"America's strategy should be a coalition strategy that includes Muslim nations as partners," the report said. "Our efforts also should be accompanied by a preventive strategy that is as much or more political as it is military. The strategy must focus clearly on the Arab and Muslim world."

But the report avoids partisanship, which commission members say would undermine its recommendations. Striking some balance, it discloses an intelligence memo President Bill Clinton received in December 1998 describing Osama bin Laden's preparations for attacks in the United States.

The document, which resembles a previously released memo President George W. Bush received in August 2001, says bin Laden and allies "are preparing for attacks in the U.S., including an aircraft hijacking."

But neither president is accused of inaction. Neither "fully understood just how many people al-Qaida might kill and how soon it might do it," the report said.

Kean, the commission chairman, said Bush and Clinton "were not served properly by the intelligence agencies."

The commission declined to assign blame specifically because failures "took place over many years and many administrations," Kean said. "Any person in a senior government position during this time bears some responsibility."

Commissioners acknowledged that the main recommendations would be difficult to enact because they would take resources and power from agencies, particularly the Defense Department. The commission would give a national intelligence director control over all 15 intelligence agencies.

Although the CIA and FBI have improved information sharing and analysis, the report said cooperation issues "have not been resolved." A new National Counterterrorism Center would coordinate intelligence, assigning tasks to agencies.

Bush, who has endorsed intelligence reform but no specifics, called the recommendations "very constructive."

Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, who supports establishing an intelligence director, said in a statement, "It's time to act -- now."

The commission stood by its finding that Saddam Hussein never teamed with al-Qaida to attack the United States.

One of the report's harshest criticisms was that billions in homeland security grants have been given out as "pork barrel" to every state regardless of its vulnerability. The commission said money should go to areas facing the highest threat.