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Sept 11 commission highlights

By The Associated Press

Highlights from reports, released on June 16 by the Sept. 11 commission, on al-Qaida's operations and the Sept. 11 plot:

Osama bin Laden and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein did not appear to have a collaborative relationship. A senior Iraqi intelligence official reportedly met with bin Laden in 1994 in Sudan and there have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al-Qaida also occurred after bin Laden returned to Afghanistan. But Iraq apparently never responded to a request from bin Laden for weapons and space to establish training camps. Two senior bin Laden associates adamantly have denied that any ties existed between al-Qaida and Iraq and there is "no credible evidence" Iraq and al-Qaida cooperated on attacks against the United States.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the attacks, envisioned a plot with 10 hijacked planes, with himself as one of the pilots. Mohammed, who is in U.S. custody at an undisclosed overseas location, told interrogators that he proposed killing every male passenger aboard, landing at a U.S. airport and making a "speech denouncing U.S. policies in the Middle East before releasing all the women and children." After bin Laden rejected that plan, Mohammed wanted U.S. commercial planes in Southeast Asia to be hijacked at the same time as the U.S. hijackings. Those planes would have exploded in flight or been crashed into U.S. targets in Asia. Bin Laden canceled that part of the plan because it would have been too difficult to synchronize.

Bin Laden wanted the fourth plane to strike the White House, but Atta believed it would be too difficult to hit and wanted to target the Capitol. Eventually, Atta agreed to the White House but kept the Capitol in reserve. Based on other exchanges between the hijackers, it remains unclear exactly which was the target on Sept. 11.

Al-Qaida intended to use 25 or 26 hijackers for the plot, instead of the 19 who took part. The commission identified at least nine "candidate hijackers" who were supposed to be part of the attacks at one time. Two were removed by the al-Qaida leadership, two failed to acquire U.S. visas, two backed out after one of them was stopped by security officers in Bahrain, one was stopped by U.S. officials at the airport in Orlando, Fla., and two apparently withdrew under pressure from their families.

There is no evidence the Saudi Arabian government or senior officials within it funded al-Qaida. However, al-Qaida was able to get money from a variety of Saudi charities that, until recently, were subject to little oversight. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, al-Qaida's funding has decreased significantly and its organization has become decentralized due to bin Laden's seclusion.

The Sept. 11 date was chosen about three weeks before the attacks. Bin Laden wanted the attacks as early as mid-2000 and told Mohammed that it would be sufficient to down the planes and not hit specific targets. Mohammed argued the operation would not be successful unless the pilots were fully trained and the hijacking teams larger. Bin Laden later wanted to time the attacks for May 12, 2001, the seven-month anniversary of the USS Cole bombing. Then he wanted it to take place when Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was visiting in June or July 2001. Both times, Mohammed said hijackers were not ready.

An illegal immigrant recently deported to Yemen, Mohdar Abdullah, allegedly made claims before leaving the United States last month that he had advance knowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks. Mohdar Abdullah was a San Diego State student who helped Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar obtain driver's licenses and enroll in schools. When interviewed by the FBI, he denied knowledge of the plans. But before his May 21 deportation, "Abdullah allegedly made various claims to individuals incarcerated with him about having advance knowledge of the operatives' 9/11 mission," telling one inmate he had received instructions to pick up operatives at Los Angeles International Airport and drive them to San Diego.

* Al-Qaida remains extremely interested in conducting chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. In 1994, al-Qaida operatives attempted to purchase uranium for $1.5 million; the uranium proved to be fake. Al-Qaida had an ambitious biological weapons program and was making advances in its ability to produce anthrax before Sept. 11. Similarly, al-Qaida may seek to conduct a chemical attack by using widely available industrial chemicals, or by attacking a chemical plant or a shipment of hazardous materials.